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UNDERSTANDING THE INTERACTION OF MOTIVATION AND OPPORTUNITY 
FOR TAX PLANNING INSIDE US MULTINATIONALS: A QUALITATIVE STUDY 
ABSTRACT 
We explore the internal workings of tax planning within US multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
using a qualitative research method. We conduct a series of interviews with senior tax 
executives, supplemented with other public information. We find that US MNEs adopt a 
heterogenous range of approaches driven by the motivations as well as the opportunities to 
reduce their tax bill legally. We develop a new theoretical framework that analyses the 
interactions of motivations and opportunities in MNEs’ tax planning strategy. We generate four 
typologies of corporate tax payers. Our study provides new insights detailing why and how 
companies plan their tax.  
 
Key words: US MNE corporate tax planning; UK subsidiary operations; international taxation; 
interviews; qualitative methods. 
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UNDERSTANDING THE INTERACTION OF MOTIVATION AND OPPORTUNITY 
FOR TAX PLANNING INSIDE US MULTINATIONALS: A QUALITATIVE STUDY 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporation tax has become a focus of interest for governments, the public and international 
bodies over recent years. Tax avoidance activities by multinational enterprises (MNEs) have 
been hitting the headlines, particularly since the global financial crisis of 2008 when the conduct 
of the commercial sector came under increased scrutiny. Since the financial crisis governments 
have also been under pressure to increase their fiscal revenues to fund public spending which 
has generated increased interest in corporate tax avoidance activities. This greater scrutiny has 
revealed that ‘tax planning’(see Literature Review for definition), has a significant impact on 
the way that MNEs structure their businesses and implement their overall strategy. It is 
therefore vital that scholars of international business (IB) scrutinise the way that tax planning 
is conducted across MNEs and are conscious of the impact it can have on overall corporate 
strategy.  
When MNEs formulate and implement their business strategy corporation tax is among the key 
factors considered, influencing decisions on the location of foreign direct investments (FDI), 
the amount of capital invested, the locations where profits are recorded, and the choice between 
retaining profits and holding cash at foreign subsidiaries versus profit repatriation. Tax planning 
may influence the role of subsidiaries within the corporate group structure and therefore has a 
wider impact on corporate strategy than simply on tax liability. 
MNEs are able to shift their profits between jurisdictions, taking different measures to increase 
their profits in lower tax jurisdictions and decrease them where taxes are higher, consequently 
reducing profits in higher tax locations, and therefore the tax payable (Samuelson, 1982; 
Rugman & Eden, 1985; Zucman, 2014). Tax competition between countries has intensified in 
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recent years as countries compete to attract inward FDI (Devereaux, Lockwood & Redoano, 
2008; Altshuler & Grubert, 2006) resulting in lower corporate tax rates. The continued 
availability of tax havens, combined with the growing tax competition means that MNEs have 
significant opportunities for MNEs’ shifting income from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions. 
Global value chains and corporate structures are becoming more complex, increasing the 
opportunities for profit shifting (Foss, Mudambi & Murtinu, 2018). UNCTAD has noted this 
the role that tax has played in driving these structures and a surge in cross border mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) ($721 billion in 2015; $432 billion in 2014) (UNCTAD 2016). 
Studies have shown that there are substantial differences between firms’ effective tax rates 
(ETRs), defined as the average rate at which a corporation is taxed on pre-tax profits (Dyreng 
et al, 2008; Blouin, 2014). The existing literature fails to provide an explanation for why some 
firms appear to engage in aggressive tax avoidance whilst others fail to (Gallemore, Maydew 
& Thornock, 2014). In their comprehensive overview of the literature, Hanlon & Heitzman 
(2010) suggest that more research is needed to explore the issue, focusing on: “Why do some 
corporations avoid more tax than others” (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Gallemore et al (2014) 
agree that: “the forces that are curtailing more widespread tax avoidance are not well 
understood.” (Gallemore et al, 2014). A clearer understanding of the factors that drive the 
differences between firms is needed with a greater focus on the impact of firm level factors and 
the decision-making processes for tax planning inside MNEs. There is no coherent theory 
available for researchers to draw on, of why and how MNEs plan their tax affairs.  
Our study aims to address these limitations and contributes to the IB literature by enhancing 
our understanding of this phenomenon. We respond to recent calls for more research that stress 
the importance of improving our understanding of how tax affects wider corporate activities 
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and strategies of MNEs and their subsidiaries (Nebus, 2016). Our central research questions 
are: 
(i) How does the motivation to avoid tax fit with the theoretical assumptions of IB’s 
motivation for internationalisation? 
(ii) What are the motivations that drive MNEs adoption of tax planning strategies?  
(iii) How do MNEs plan their tax affairs to take advantage of the opportunities available 
to them? 
We adopt an interdisciplinary approach by integrating IB literature with research from other 
disciplines but with the intention of explaining the phenomenon from a perspective that is 
relevant to IB readers. We use a qualitative research method, aiming to reveal how decisions 
are made within the MNE and what are the key influences on this decision-making in order to 
generate a specific understanding of what drives the heterogeneity of approaches adopted (Doz, 
2011; Birkinshaw, Brannen & Tung, 2011). We also make a clear theoretical contribution, 
generating a typology of companies and their approaches to tax planning. We explore how 
existing IB theory, specifically Dunning’s work on FDI motivation, can be adapted to generate 
new theoretical insight into the tax planning strategies adopted by MNEs. 
We conduct a series of interviews with experienced tax executives working within the tax 
departments of MNEs and tax advisory firms. We narrow our focus to their UK and US 
experience. This is a limitation of this paper and further work is needed to consider whether our 
findings apply to MNEs from other countries. We supplement and triangulate our data with 
information collected from other public data sources.  
Our study makes three new theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature: 
1. Our core theoretical contribution is to develop a new theoretical framework on the 
typology of MNEs that analyses the interaction between their motivation to avoid tax 
and the opportunities that are presented to them.  
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2. We provide new empirical evidence about how US MNEs and their UK subsidiaries 
plan their tax affairs by presenting the key findings from 15 semi-structured interviews 
conducted with senior tax executives (11 initial interviews and 4 follow up interviews).  
3. Our interdisciplinary research approach of integrating the perspectives of IB literature 
with other disciplines in our literature synthesis, the discussion of our empirical findings 
and development of a new typology is original. This approach enables us to provide an 
in-depth understanding of the heterogeneity of tax planning approaches adopted by 
MNEs and their subsidiaries.  
LITERATURE SYNTHESIS 
The term “tax planning” has recently become widely used and is intended to encompass the 
broad range of activities undertaken by firms implementing a strategic approach to reducing 
their tax bill whilst staying within the bounds of what is legally acceptable. The terms “tax 
planning”, “tax avoidance”, “profit shifting” and “income shifting” tend to be used 
interchangeably in the literature. Profit shifting is defined as the allocation of income and 
expenses between related parties of the same legal entity with the focus to shift profits from 
higher tax jurisdictions to lower tax jurisdictions so as to reduce tax liability of the whole group. 
Our systematic literature review reveals that research on taxation comes from a broad range of 
fields, including economics, accounting, finance and law as well as IB. The relevant IB 
literature focuses mainly on the theory of FDI motives (Dunning, 1993) with theory relating to 
other areas of tax remaining relatively under-developed. Dunning’s (1993) theory can be 
extended to contribute to our understanding of the motivation to avoid tax. The literature from 
other disciplines generates an understanding of companies’ opportunities to avoid tax. This 
literature is largely empirical, focusing on the ways in which companies are able to profit shift.  
It is now widely accepted that tax differentials between countries affect the behaviour of MNEs 
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(Altshuler & Grubert, 2002; Rego, 2003; Markle & Shackelford, 2009; Hanlon &Heitzman, 
2010; Azemar, 2010; Dharmapala & Riedel, 2013; Fuest, Spengel, Finke, Heckemeyer & 
Nusser, 2013; Taylor, Richardson & Lanis, 2015). Research at the aggregate level has 
demonstrated that US companies have considerable ability to shift their profits (Grubert & 
Mutti, 1991; Hines & Rice, 1994; Huizinga & Laeven, 2008), that this ability is increasing 
(Altshuler, Grubert & Newlon, 2000; Klassen & LaPlante, 2012; Zucman, 2014) and that MNEs 
are becoming more sensitive to tax rates (Altshuler, Grubert & Newlon, 2000).  
MNEs choose to use profit shifting to mitigate the effects of host country statutory tax rates and 
regulations. A tranche of existing studies consider the existence and magnitude of profit shifting 
motivated by tax avoidance (Grubert & Mutti, 1991; Hines & Rice, 1994; Huizinga & Laeven, 
2008; Azemar 2010; Klassen & LaPlante 2012; Dharmapala & Riedel, 2013; Zucman 2014). 
The research cited above uses a range of different methodologies and findings vary but whilst 
there are methodological problems, stemming from the confidentiality of the data, all determine 
that there is a significant issue of profit shifting. Examining the MNE from the outside, with 
limited data means it is difficult to determine how much profit shifting occurs and how this is 
changing over time. Whilst politicians and policy makers are convinced that there is significant 
profit shifting, there is no single approach that can confirm this. It is also clear, however, that 
there is heterogeneity in the way that similar companies, with similar opportunities, plan their 
tax affairs (Dyreng, 2008). Thus, we need to advance our theoretical understanding of the 
factors that drive one MNE to take a more aggressive approach to tax planning than another 
and the consequent implications of this for broader corporate strategy.  
1.1.The motivation for tax planning 
Most IB work examining the motivations of MNEs considers the motivation to internationalise: 
understanding what drives FDI, where and how investments are made, is key to understanding 
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the behaviour of the MNE. There remains scope for research on broader motivations to add to 
our understanding of the wider behaviour of the MNE. Benito (2015) argues that understanding 
motives more widely is important as they are ‘useful elements for theory building in 
international business’ (Benito, 2015). This paper considers the neglected issue of motivation 
to avoid taxes. As discussed above, there is considerable variation between firms in their 
engagement with tax planning and little extant work which considers what drives these 
differences, particularly at the firm level. 
Much work on understanding the motivation for FDI has built on Dunning’s (1993) classic 
work presenting four key FDI motivations: market seeking; efficiency seeking; natural resource 
seeking and (strategic) asset seeking. More recent work on internationalisation however, 
focuses on ‘how’ and ‘what’ questions about FDI rather than focusing on the motivation, the 
‘why’ question (van Tulder, 2015). Van Tulder (2015) argues that a richer understanding of 
what motivates companies to internationalise, and the tensions and trade-offs that they make 
between different motives is key to adding depth to scholars’ understanding of the actual 
internationalisation strategies of companies. Understanding why companies have chosen to 
internationalise in the way that they have is also a necessary component in enabling evaluation 
of company performance. 
Van Tulder (2015) argues that Dunning’s key four motivations are all intrinsic to the firm and 
that their intrinsic nature ensures that they fit within the neo classical approach adopted by many 
IB theorists. By contrast, the extrinsic motives for internationalisation relate to the home and 
host country characteristics. Dunning (1993) also includes other, extrinsic, motivations for FDI 
that have often been overlooked in subsequent work. These include: escape investments, 
support investments and passive investments. Escape investments include those where the 
MNE’s overseas investment is initiated in order to escape negative conditions in the home 
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country, such as high levels of corporate taxes or other, stringent regulations such as those 
pertaining to the environment or labour. Studies (van Tulder, 2015; Cuervo-Cazurra, Narula & 
Un, 2015; Cuervo-Cazurra & Narula, 2015) have pointed out the unwarranted neglect of these 
wider motivations and the need for further research to increase our understanding. This paper 
makes a theoretical contribution by considering the concept of tax avoidance as an extrinsic 
‘escape’ motive and explores the extent to which MNEs are indeed motivated to invest overseas 
to reduce their home tax burden.  
This adds to our understanding of the extent to which MNEs are motivated by ‘escape’ and the 
interaction between this and other motivations. We argue, however, that the motivation to avoid 
tax is not synonymous with the motive to internationalise. Whilst the two are often inextricably 
linked, this paper argues that the motive to avoid taxes is a separate, clearly defined motive. 
Whilst the desire to ‘escape’ from high domestic taxes may lead a firm to internationalise, in 
reality the two processes are likely to exist separately. Dunning’s (1993) four key motives 
define the key reasons underpinning a firm’s motivation to internationalise. The firm may want 
to avoid taxes as well as internationalise but these motivations are likely to be distinct. The fact 
that a firm has existing international operations, rather than motivating the firm, provides it 
with greater opportunities to avoid tax. A firm which has extensive international operations 
may use these to implement a profit shifting strategy. Equally, a firm which already has 
extensive international operations may find setting up an additional tax haven subsidiary less 
of an impediment than a firm which has little experience of international operations. We argue 
that a firm may be motivated to avoid tax but that this is unlikely to initiate an 
internationalisation process; a firm which is already internationalised, however, will have 
greater opportunities and the skills or knowledge required to instigate a tax avoidance strategy. 
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In order to trigger the extrinsic ‘escape’ motive, companies must have an alternative, a location 
that offers lower taxes or less stringent regulations for example. Location-specific advantages 
(LAs) are the advantages offered by countries, making them attractive to the MNE as a place 
to do business. It is now widely accepted that tax differentials between countries affect the 
behaviour of MNEs, with lower taxes generating higher FDI (Markle & Shackelford, 2009; 
Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010; Dharmapala & Riedel, 2013; Fuest, Spengel, Finke, Heckemeyer 
& Nusser, 2013; Taylor, Richardson & Lanis, 2015). Rugman & Eden (1985) point to the 
advantage generated by the MNE’s ability to benefit from differences in factor input prices in 
different locations, from differences in government regulations and from differences in 
statutory corporate income tax rates (Rugman & Eden, 1985).  
Whilst the studies above contribute to an understanding of what motivates MNEs to adopt tax 
planning, they do not amount to a general theory of motivation which is needed to generate a 
comprehensive view of how corporation tax fits within MNEs’ strategic direction. A summary 
of literature that is directly or indirectly related to tax planning motivation is presented in Table 
1. Our work extends Dunning’s (1993) work which focuses on motivation and FDI, by focusing 
our lens on motivation to avoid tax.  
Table 1 
1.1.1. Existing research on factors affecting motivation 
Table 1 summarises the existing research on factors that may drive a firm’s motivation under 
the headings of Reputation, Management and Leadership and Heterogeneity. This section 
therefore  
Research demonstrates that firms may be reluctant to engage in tax avoidance due to concerns 
about the impact it may have on their reputation (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; Hanlon 
&Slemrod, 2009; Chen, Huang, Li & Stanfield, 2012; Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin & Shroff, 
2014). Extant research varies in terms of whether it assumes that the reputational cost impacts 
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the firm level (Hanlon & Slemrod, 2009) or individual level (Crocker & Slemrod, 2005; Desai 
& Dharmapala, 2006). At the firm level Hanlon & Slemrod (2009) find that share prices are 
negatively impacted by revelations of tax avoiding activity. Gallemore et al (2014) confirm this 
finding but find that the negative impact is short lived, with share prices systematically 
returning to the level they were at before the tax avoidance revelations. Interestingly Austin & 
Wilson (2017) consider firms with different levels of ‘customer orientation’ to test their 
hypothesis that firms with a greater customer orientation are likely to suffer more reputational 
harm. They find no difference between the cash taxes paid but find that consumer-oriented 
firms do consistently report high ETRs; a clear indication that the impact of reputation in 
driving tax planning behaviour affects different types of firms to a greater or lesser extent. This 
also demonstrates firms’ ability to present their taxes as reported in the annual reports in a 
planned manner. 
A second stream of research has considered the impact of tax avoidance on reputation at the 
individual – largely Chief Executive Officer (CEO) level. Gallemore, Maydew & Thornock 
(2014) however, examine CEO turnover rates and find that there is little evidence of impact on 
CEOs after tax avoidance activity has been revealed. Chyz & Gaertner (2018) consider the role 
that reputation plays in tax avoidance they hypothesise that if concerns about reputational 
damage impact behaviour then CEOs would undergo more forced turnover when their ETRs 
are low. They find the converse: that CEOs’ contracts are more likely to be terminated when 
their firm pays higher taxes as they represent a transfer of wealth to government and from the 
shareholders. They also, however, find that CEO forced turnover is higher when firms pay a 
higher rate of tax compared to their peers. They find that the relationship may differ when there 
is a high level of regulatory interest in tax avoidance such that there is a relationship between 
CEO termination and low ETRs but only in periods of time when there is a high level of 
regulatory interest in tax avoidance. Clearly the relationship is complex and more research is 
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needed to clarify the role of reputation in driving motivation for tax avoidance and to explore 
whether reputation impacts at the firm or individual level. 
1.2.Opportunities for tax planning 
There is a large body of empirical literature, largely from outside the field of IB that tends to 
be concerned with either evaluating the scale of existing profit shifting or attempting to 
understand the use of specific mechanisms to reduce tax legally. Most of this work does not 
aim to understand the differences between companies, treating the MNEs as if they were 
homogenous. Some work does attempt to evaluate the impact of factors, such as size 
(Zimmerman, 1985, Gupta & Newberry, 1997, Rego, 2003, Taylor, Lanis & Richardson, 2015) 
or the degree of multinationality of the firm (Grubert & Mutti, 1991; Rego, 2003; Dyreng & 
Lyndsey, 2009; Taylor, Lanis & Richardson, 2015). We now consider what is currently known 
about how MNEs are able to plan their tax affairs, what aspects of their structure or business 
confer greater opportunities to avoid tax. 
Research at the aggregate level has demonstrated that US companies have considerable ability 
to shift their profits (Grubert & Mutti, 1992; Hines & Rice, 1994; Huizinga & Laeven, 2008) 
and that this ability is growing (Klassen & LaPlante, 2012; Zucman, 2014) with MNE actions 
becoming more sensitive to tax rates (Altshuler, Grubert & Newlon, 2000). 
There are a number of key mechanisms used by MNEs to shift their profits from higher tax 
jurisdictions to lower tax jurisdictions or even to tax havens, defined as jurisdictions that offer 
the MNE a lower tax rate or no tax, so that the MNE can locate some of its business activities 
there and thus reduce overall tax payments (Rugman & Collinson, 2012). We briefly survey the 
literature on key mechanisms below in order to set the context for our research. The ability to 
take advantage of these mechanisms confers the opportunity to avoid tax on the MNE.  Key 
mechanisms include: location of doing business; the use of transfer pricing in related party 
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transactions; the use of intangible assets and the concurrent use of royalties; capital structure 
and the use of internal debt; profit repatriation (dividend payment) versus cash holding; using 
losses carried forward. Our review clearly demonstrates that the way in which these 
opportunities may present themselves varies between businesses, driving a heterogeneity of 
opportunities. 
Companies’ attitudes to risk taking is also a factor in how they view the opportunities that are 
available to them and whether they are likely to pursue a more aggressive tax planning agenda. 
Langenmayer & Lester (2018) consider the effect of tax rates on firms’ decisions to undertake 
risky investment. They find that the statutory tax rate in a country has a positive effect on risk 
taking for firms that expect to use losses in the future, and a weaker effect for those that do not 
plan to use losses in the future. Whilst this research is not focused on tax avoidance per se, it 
clearly demonstrates the impact that the company’s attitude to risk taking has on its activities 
and their consideration of strategic issues, including the statutory rate of tax when deciding 
whether to undergo risky activities. 
1.2.1. Location 
One of the simplest ways for MNEs to reduce their effective tax rate (ETR), (defined as a 
measure of tax charged as the numerator with a measure of income as the denominator), is to 
consider the locations where they operate. MNEs can consider the host country tax rates and 
regulations when choosing where to base operations. Research confirms a negative relationship 
between the statutory rate and investment (Devereux & Griffiths, 2003; De Mooij & Ederveen, 
2006; Azemar, 2010). The interaction of the host and home country tax systems is key because 
MNEs want to ensure that their overall pattern of international ownership is efficient (Barrios, 
Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2012). Some MNEs may have greater freedom when deciding 
on the location of overseas operations depending on the LAs that they need to take advantage 
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of. Dyreng & Maydew (2012) find that firms with more extensive operations in countries with 
a ‘weak rule of law’ and tax havens engage in more earnings management than companies with 
subsidiaries in countries where the ‘rule of law is stronger’.  
Barrios et al (2012) find that the location decisions for highly profitable subsidiaries are less 
responsive to tax inducements than for less profitable subsidiaries. This leads them to speculate 
that high profitability could be location specific, such that moving the subsidiary could reduce 
profitability. Location decisions of foreign subsidiaries with low fixed assets are more sensitive 
to parent and host country taxation reflecting the fact that they are simpler to physically move 
than those with higher levels of fixed assets. MNEs operating with more profitable location 
specific subsidiaries, or those with high levels of fixed assets may have the opportunity to 
choose to locate their operations in low tax jurisdictions.  
Some MNEs may choose to enter into a M&A with the specific aim of “inverting” the 
ownership structure such that the newly acquired subsidiary becomes the parent company. 
Inversions have been politically controversial in the US in recent years with companies that 
choose to invert subject to criticism. The regulations on allowable inversions have also been 
tightened. This may affect the ability of some companies to choose this course of action.  
The use of tax havens by MNEs has been well documented in the literature (Hines & Rice, 
1994; Shaxson, 2011; Jones & Temouri, 2016; Jones, Temouri & Cobham 2018). Tax havens 
are characterised by having very low or zero rates of corporation tax and have high levels of 
secrecy that make them attractive to MNEs (Shaxson, 2011; Zucman, 2015). It is hard to define 
exactly what constitutes a tax haven so researchers have used different definitions to limit the 
scope of their work. What is of interest here, is not that MNEs use tax havens, but an 
understanding of the underlying factors that generate the potential for MNEs to take advantage 
of them as an opportunity to avoid tax. Hines & Rice (1994) split tax havens into “dot tax 
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havens”, essentially small island economies and the “Big 7” (Hong Kong, Ireland, Lebanon, 
Liberia, Panama, Singapore and Switzerland). These have low rates of taxation but have larger 
markets that may also be attractive to overseas companies. By considering only “dot tax 
havens”, researchers are able to focus on those where there are fewer additional motivations to 
invest. Desai, Foley & Hines (2006) find that nearly 60 per cent of US companies with 
substantial foreign operations had at least one subsidiary in a tax haven country.  
It is often assumed that all international companies are able to structure their international 
operations to take advantage of tax havens. Jones & Temouri (2016), however, investigate the 
drivers for tax haven usage and conclude that technology intensive manufacturing MNEs and 
service industry MNEs, that is, those with high levels of intangible assets are more likely to 
own tax haven subsidiaries.  
1.2.2. Transfer pricing  
Transfer prices (TP) are the prices used for the flow of intermediate or finished goods or 
services between affiliates of the same firm. They are known as related party transactions (e.g. 
intra-firm trade, intra-firm loans, royalty charges and management fees, etc.). Tax is an issue 
when transfers are made between affiliates in different locations when these are located in 
different jurisdictions. OECD guidelines state that related party transactions should be 
accounted for as if they were “arm’s length” transactions with a third party (OECD 2010). This 
relies on the existence of an external market to provide reference prices. If no such market 
exists, which may be the case particularly for transfers of intermediate or knowledge based 
goods or services, it can be difficult to assess whether the prices used are indeed “arm’s length 
prices” (Rugman, 1980; Rugman & Eden, 1985).  
Although it is hard to ascertain the extent to which MNEs manipulate transfer prices, there is 
evidence (Eden, Valdez & Li, 2005) that companies are able to manipulate prices effectively to 
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shift corporate profits to lower tax jurisdictions. Clausing (2003) finds evidence for profit 
shifting using TP and finds that TP used for intra firm transfers of knowledge or services are 
more acutely sensitive to the tax differentials between countries.  
Some companies may have longer value chains offering greater scope to use TP manipulation 
to shift profits. TP manipulation is defined as the deliberate setting of the TP paid by one party 
to another within the same group for the purpose of reducing the aggregate tax burden of the 
company and its affiliates. This can be done through overcharging (undercharging) affiliates in 
high (low) tax locations for intermediate goods or the use of intellectual property, consequently 
reducing (increasing) profits, and therefore the tax payable in high tax regimes (Samuelson, 
1982; Rugman & Eden, 1985; Zucman, 2014).  
Others may use TP to price the movement of goods or services which are particularly opaque, 
making it more difficult for authorities to judge the accuracy or relevance of the TP in use. 
These companies may therefore have more scope to use TP manipulation to shift profits. 
Research that focuses on TP specifically is difficult to conduct due to the confidentiality of 
information but could make a significant contribution to the understanding of how companies 
are able to strategically plan their taxes. 
1.2.3. Intangible assets, royalties and overheads 
Intangible assets are an increasingly important source of competitiveness (Lipsey, 2007). The 
ownership of intangible assets or intellectual property (IP) can easily be shifted between 
locations, and their public good nature means that they can be used by more than one subsidiary 
at a time. Royalty payments charged on the use of intangible assets are considered a tax-
deductible expense in the host country and as additional (taxable) income in the home country 
(Grubert, 2003). The opaque nature of IP means that it is hard find an applicable arm’s length 
price with which to compare it making it difficult to judge the “correct” price that a MNE should 
 16 
charge (Gravelle, 2008). IP is often unique and is likely to have no functioning market to 
generate comparable prices (Dyreng, Hanlon & Maydew, 2008; Shackelford, Slemrod & 
Sallee, 2011). Companies with competitive advantage generated through the use of intangible 
assets may therefore have more opportunity to profit shift with impunity (Grubert & Mutti, 
2007; Dischinger & Riedel 2011).  
Some centrally incurred overhead costs may also be re-charged out to subsidiaries and there is 
likely to be some discretion available to the company in the way that it calculates the 
apportionment of these overheads as “management fees”, etc. (Contractor, 2016). The 
opportunities here are likely to be relatively small in scale but the lack of agreed mechanism 
for doing this may require careful consideration in tax planning on the part of the MNE and its 
subsidiaries (Altshuler, Shay & Toder, 2015).  
It is noted that a number of jurisdictions’ tax laws have no longer allowed management fees as 
a tax deductible expense. OECD released new guidance on transfer pricing for low-value 
adding intra-group services under BEPS Actions 8-10 (Ernst & Young, 2015). A number of tax 
authorities have raised concerns that MNEs may attempt to re-categorize management fees as 
“service fees” in order to obtain tax deductibility for otherwise non-tax deductible charges. 
Examples of service charges are IT costs, R&D and engineering support services, services of 
shared service centres, etc. Because these services are intangible in nature they are subject to 
withholding taxes in these jurisdictions. A functional profile based benefit test with detailed 
supporting documentation and data retention is likely to be a key starting point for the tax 
authorities in their review. 
1.2.4. Companies with digital delivery of services  
Companies operating with the digital delivery of services may be a special case as their 
flexibility in operations – their ability to locate remotely from the customer - means that they 
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have substantial opportunities to strategically plan their corporation taxes. Companies such as 
Facebook and Google are able to choose where to locate their headquarters or regional 
headquarters in such a way as to minimise tax. Google was criticised by the UK’s Public 
Accounts Committee (the UK Parliament, House of Commons, 2012) for establishing their 
regional headquarters in Ireland, where the corporate income tax rate is 12.5 per cent and for 
the fact that the UK subsidiary, where the corporate tax rate was 20 per cent in 2012, 
consequently had no authority to sign a deal with a customer, despite employing a significant 
sales force. This demonstrates the impact that tax planning has on the day to day operations and 
longer term strategy of Google as a business. 
1.2.5. Internal debt and capital structure 
Debt can also be used as a mechanism to reduce corporate taxation. Interest expense is a tax-
deductible liability, as it reduces the taxable profits of the firm. Intra-firm borrowing (internal 
debt) and lending can therefore be used to shift profits from high to low tax countries: an 
affiliate in a high tax country borrows money from and pays interest to an affiliate in a low tax 
country. The OECD Guidelines (2010) state that the interest payments should be set at a rate 
which reflects the arm’s length rate. The level of risk attached to the loan however, will 
influence the appropriate rate of interest and may not be easily observed by those outside the 
firm.  
Previous research has identified unusually high levels of debt in high tax countries (Gordon & 
Lee, 2001; Egger, Eggert, Keuschnigg & Winner, 2010) but no research has been conducted on 
the firm characteristics that enable this transfer to take place.  
1.2.6. Losses carried forward 
MNEs that have made losses in the past are able to use these to offset against future tax 
liabilities. This can significantly reduce an MNE’s future tax payments. There is however, little 
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published research into this area of tax planning, possibly because losses are not thought to be 
something that MNEs can manipulate.  Companies may however, consider carefully where to 
accumulate losses in order to maximise their potential for tax planning. Loss making companies 
are often excluded from research on tax with little explanation for why this is the case (Rego, 
2003; Markle & Shackelford, 2009; Dharmapala & Riedel, 2013). Hanlon & Heitzman (2010 
p.129) point out that: “we do not have a very good understanding of loss making firms, the 
utilization and value of tax-loss carry-forwards and how the existence of losses affects the 
behaviour …of any of the involved parties”. 
We summarize the literature on key mechanisms used in tax planning in Table 2. 
Table 2 here 
METHODOLOGY 
1.3. Rationale of research approach 
We aim to extend our knowledge by looking inside the “black box” of tax planning because 
information about how companies actually plan their tax affairs is scarce (Eberhartinger & 
Fellner-Rohling, 2012; Feller & Schanz, 2017; Wilson, 1993). Research in this area is hampered 
by the confidential nature of the subject. Tax is a sensitive issue, with MNEs’ tax payments and 
approach under intense scrutiny. The lack of available data therefore impedes empirical 
research in this area. Another major problem with the extant tax research is the focus on large 
scale data, which provides only limited insights into our level of focus: the firm. (Feller & 
Schanz, 2017). 
We use a qualitative methodology as the key research method in our study. A qualitative 
approach has been used in tax research in the fields of accounting, public finance and policy 
(Ahrens & Chapman, 2006; Feller & Schanz, 2017; Morrell & Tuck, 2014; Vaivio, 2008). In 
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the same vein, qualitative research is a useful approach for IB research, potentially providing 
new and in-depth insights to enhance our understanding of a phenomenon. There have been 
recent calls from within IB (Doz 2011; Birkinshaw, Brannen & Tung, 2011) for greater 
emphasis on qualitative research methodologies. Qualitative research can, as here, make a key 
contribution towards the development of theory (Doz, 2011; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1989, 
1994), generating a deeper understanding of what happens within organisations and how that 
can change over time. Doz (2011) claims that ‘Only rich, thick descriptions can provide the 
basis for the use and possible synthesis of multiple theories into new conceptual development’ 
(Doz, 2011. p.584). The lack of coherent theory in relation to corporate tax planning indicates 
that detailed qualitative research has a significant contribution to make in this area.  
We start with a broad research objective, implicit and explicit initial “tentative hypotheses to 
explain something” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 147) based on the extant literature. We then 
refer back and forth to inductively accommodate new findings from our data into a framework 
with initial hypotheses. As new information emerges, these hypotheses are adjusted accordingly 
(Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). We follow the iterative process of theory development, data 
collection and interpretation. This approached has been adopted in previous tax accounting 
research (Feller & Schanz, 2017).  
1.4.Research setting and sampling 
Our study covers US MNEs with UK subsidiary operations within a broad range of industries 
to increase the comparability of our findings on the phenomenon. We also target tax advisory 
firms due their influential role on the firm-level tax planning (Jones et al., 2018). We aimed to 
interview people with sufficient seniority and experience to have familiarity with the way in 
which firms approach the development of their tax planning strategy but to also have a good 
grasp of technical detail. We decided that these individuals would be qualified accountants but 
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could then be working either in a tax role within industry or within an advisory (tax practice) 
role.  
It was not possible to identify individuals using a typical sampling method due to the difficulty 
involved in finding willing participants. Expecting a poor response rate, driven by the 
foreseeable issues of confidentiality, we decided to identify participants through two routes. In 
the first, more traditional, route, we compiled a list of the largest 100 US companies with UK 
operations in terms of turnover. We used multiple data sources, including Osiris database by 
Bureau van Dijk to identify the parent companies and Fame database by Bureau van Dijk to 
search for their UK subsidiaries. We obtained the names of the parent companies’ and the UK 
subsidiaries’ finance directors from Osiris and Fame databases. We also consulted document 
filings by the subsidiaries with the UK Companies House. We had some concerns that 
companies who self-selected in this way could result in biased sample in that those responding 
to an unsolicited letter could have had a positive tax story to tell. 
For the second route we identified potential participants through personal networks. Whilst not 
a traditional method for identifying interview participants we felt that it was justified due to the 
serious issues of confidentiality. Using personal contacts and recommendations gave the 
interviewees more confidence that they could speak freely to the interviewer. We ensured that 
the interviewees identified in this way were similar in terms of seniority as those responding to 
the invitation letter. None of the interviewees were personally known to the interviewer who is 
one of the authors of this study. The advantage was that those identified in this manner were 
more likely to represent a range of opinions and experiences as they had not self-selected. We 
put a lot of time (approximately six months) and effort in order to secure the interviews. 
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 In total we conducted initial interviews with eleven senior tax executives with extensive 
experience in corporate tax with an average career span of over 30 years.  
After we had generated the typology of MNEs, we tried to return to the original interviewees 
to conduct a second round of interviews. We were able to secure interviews with just less than 
half of the original interviewees (four) In total we therefore conducted 15 interviews. 
Various research settings may require different numbers of interviews to reach meaningful 
conclusions (Feller & Schanz, 2017). From our perspective, 15 individual interviews is 
sufficient; we were confident that we had reached saturation as we found that there was a lack 
of disagreement between interviewees, and the level of repetition between them seemed to 
suggest that saturation had been achieved (Suddaby, 2006). The coherence between the 
interviews and lack of diversity of opinions between the eleven subjects gives confidence that 
a larger number of interviews would not have been likely to elicit more varied views. Thus, the 
relatively low number of interviews does not affect the depth of knowledge gained, our analyses 
and conclusions (Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006). All of the interviewees were very well-versed 
about government tax policies and tax planning practices in both the US and the UK. Table 3 
presents some background information about the two rounds of interviews, the participating 
individuals and their organisations.  
Table 3 here  
For triangulation purposes, we consulted and reviewed archival information of these companies 
and their subsidiaries from multiple public data sources, including the company websites; the 
US parent companies’ 10-year annual reports/ 10-K filings (2005-2014); the UK subsidiaries’ 
10-year full accounts filed with the UK Companies House; and business and finance news in 
the press associated with their businesses.  
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1.5.Data collection  
Interviewees were guaranteed confidentiality and were requested to sign a consent form. Whilst 
the purpose of this form is to protect the interviewee, several did not want to sign it, citing a 
preference to keep the relationship informal and, in their view, more confidential. This 
reluctance emphasised the extremely confidential nature of the discussions.  
We conducted the interviews using a semi-structured framework with a flexible schedule of 
questions that was piloted before being used in the recorded interviews.  
The first round of were held face to face (except one which was conducted by phone (where a 
tax adviser was currently working in China)  and lasted for more than an hour each time. These 
were conducted in 2016. The second, follow up set of interviews were held in 2019 in order to 
return to the same interviewees and explore issues around motivation and opportunity in more 
detail as well as to update findings following the recent, significant, changes to the US tax 
system. These follow up interviews were conducted by phone and were generally shorter, 
lasting for more than thirty minutes each time.  
Where possible we recorded the interviews and then transcribed subsequently. This was not 
possible in two instances where the interviewees objected to a recording being made. In these 
instances the interviewer took detailed notes during the interview and supplemented with 
additional notes directly afterwards. The interviewees were guaranteed confidentiality in that 
whilst their views can be shared their names and organisations cannot. The interviewees clearly 
felt comfortable with the process and the confidentiality that was guaranteed. This was reflected 
in their disclosure of substantial details about explicit tax planning schemes as well as the 
specifics of legal cases that they had been involved in. These disclosures demonstrated the 
interviewees’ acceptance of the confidentiality of the interview. The interviewer’s previous 
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experience working in a big four auditing firm may have helped to reduce the interviewees’ 
disquiet.  
We gathered information about the interviewees’ professional background; their views on 
public perceptions of tax avoidance; views of government policies; revenue collectors (Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) in the UK and the Inland Revenue Service (IRS) in 
the US) and international organizations (EU and OECD). We asked all interviewees about their 
detailed knowledge of motivations and opportunities for tax planning. Within these categories, 
we ensured that the interviews remained open, to allow the interviewees sufficient scope to 
discuss their specific views, actions, interactions, involvements and decision making. We also 
used prompts where necessary to encourage detailed and exhaustive accounts.  
We followed Lincoln & Guba (1985) to use a number of techniques to strengthen the 
trustworthiness of the qualitative research. These included confidentiality of information, 
triangulation, several iterations of data analysis and constant circling between data and 
literature.  
1.6.Data analysis 
Our interviews aimed to: 
(i) generate new in-depth information on the internal workings of the company - the ‘black 
box’ of decision making to provide sufficient detail to enable the development of new 
theory (Doz, 2011);  
(ii) gain insight from senior tax executives into the ways that companies plan tax and how 
this has changed over recent years. The research also aimed to generate new insights 
that would improve theoretical understanding of the issues in this area. 
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The primary objective of the analysis was to inductively build theory based on the detailed 
findings (Welch, Piekkari, Plakoyiannaki & Paavilainen-Mäntymäki, 2011). As the focus of 
this study is on the internal workings of tax planning inside the MNE and its subsidiaries it was 
introduced as such to interviewees, emphasizing our interest in the executives’ views, actions, 
experience and decision-making in tax planning. The theoretical scope of our study was to 
analyse why and how MNEs plan tax affairs and to identify typologies of corporate tax payers. 
We analysed the interviews in a systematic and consistent manner using Nvivo specialist 
software, which enables specific themes to be identified and subsequently used to code the 
interview transcripts (Bringer, Johnston and Brackenridge 2004). Due to space constraints, 
selected uncorrected quotes are reported in the text to support our discussion whereas detailed 
quotes by themes are presented in Appendix 1. 
We carefully re-read the transcripts and listened to the recordings a number of times. When 
new codes were identified from the data previous transcripts were revisited so that these codes 
could be used. We then identified key patterns of occurrences and linkages of second order 
themes (within-case analysis) and those patterns across 15 cases (cross-case analysis) and 
insights from the analysis.  
The importance of both a firm’s motivation and the opportunities presented to them to avoid 
tax emerged as clear determinants of tax planning strategies. The typology presented in Figure 
1 emerged as we analysed the findings. Interviewees spoke of different levels of ‘aggression’ 
with which MNEs would approach their tax planning strategy and also clearly distinguished 
between the different types of opportunities available to the different companies that they had 
worked for. 
Finally, we summarized our findings, as shown in the framework in Figure 1.  
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KEY FINDINGS  
The following sections detail the results of the analysis. We use uncorrected quotations within 
the text to add support to the discussion or to highlight a particular point. We use the results to 
develop our key theoretical contribution, a typology of tax planning strategies (Fig 1) which 
highlights the heterogeneity of approaches and indicates some of the key factors that drive the 
differences between companies. The “high” or “low” motivations and opportunities are relative 
notions, depending on the relevant factors and in relative to the motivations and opportunities 
of other companies.  The vertical axis presents the motivations for tax planning and the 
horizontal axis presents the opportunities for tax planning.  
The typology that we present emerged from the interviews. Whilst interviewees did not frame 
their responses in this way they spoke at length about differences in the opportunities that 
present to companies and the heterogeneity of responses that companies display. Our initial 
interviews were focused on understanding this heterogeneity and the differences presented 
themselves clearly on these two axes. The discussions with interviewees make it clear that a 
range of factors from within the company affect the motivations and the opportunities to adopt 
an aggressive tax planning stance. Some companies have more opportunities to avoid taxes by 
shifting profits to lower tax jurisdictions than others. Interview ees discussed the 
approaches to tax planning that they have encountered. The view was strongly expressed that 
companies have the scope to make decisions on the stance that they take. Tax laws and 
regulations are seen as providing grey areas, within which MNEs have scope for decision-
making and strategic planning. Tax planning was seen as a continuum where the risk of damage 
to reputation and potential fines from HMRC and IRS, are balanced against the potential to 
save money on tax payments. It was the decisions stemming from this approach that drove 
much of the discussion in interviews. 
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We follow Balogun (2003) and Tippmann et al. (2012) to structure the findings and discuss 
each cell in detail. It is noted that the names of companies that are mentioned in four cells of 
Figure 1 are for illustration purposes only. Information and data on these companies are drawn 
from public records, such as the European Parliament, the UK's Parliament, House of Commons 
Public Accounts Committee, the US Government Hearings on Offshore Profiting Shifting and 
the US Tax Code, business and finance press and academic literature.  The quotes that are cited 
in italics presented in each cell come from the companies that we interviewed and their names 
are anonymous due to confidential reasons. 
Figure 1  
Factors affecting a firm’s motivation: 
 The importance of reputation to a firm. 
 The financial position of the firm 
 The individuals leading the firm, their personal ethics and experience 
 View of firm’s responsibility to their shareholders 
 Use of targets, KPIs etc relating to ETR and corporation tax paid 
Factors affecting a firm’s opportunities to engage in tax avoidance activities: 
 The clarity of a firm’s economic activity – where and when a sale is made for example, 
affects the opportunities available to them. 
 Corporate size, degree of internationality and the locations where they do business 
 Extent to which the firm’s business relies on IP and transfer pricing 
 Extent of involvement in M&A activity 
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1.7.Aggressive tax avoiders 
Companies in the first quadrant are called the “aggressive tax avoiders”. They have both 
motivation and considerable opportunity to avoid tax.  
Opportunities 
The opportunities that they are presented with are likely to stem from having significant 
operations in the digital sphere or within a highly IP intensive sector such as the pharmaceutical 
industry. Digital companies may have greater scope to plan their tax affairs by booking sales in 
a low tax country. Without a physical product it is harder to define exactly where a sale has 
been made, conferring greater flexibility on these companies. Companies such as those in the 
pharmaceutical industry are able to shift profits using mechanisms such as royalty or transfer 
pricing for intra-group transactions and payments. The value that should be attributed to 
movements within these firms is inherently difficult to observe from outside the firm, giving 
them scope to manipulate prices to transfer profits between subsidiaries. 
Companies such as Amazon, Apple, Google, Facebook or Pfizer among other US firms have 
been accused of aggressive tax planning and would fit within this quadrant (Dischinger & 
Riedel, 2010; the European Parliament, 2018a, b; Financial Times, 2016a, b; the US 
Government, 2013; the UK Parliament, House of Commons, Public Accounts Committee, 
2012).  
Motivation 
Other companies that could fit here could include those that have a less direct relationship with 
the public and may therefore have less concern about any reputational impact from tax 
avoidance. Companies that are struggling financially or are at an early stage of development 
may also feel more pressure to avoid tax in order to maintain their annual cash flow. 
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Interviewees suggested that companies have a responsibility to shareholders to ensure that they 
paid only a minimum, obligatory, level of tax. The actual level of tax paid was seen as a 
consequence of choices and strategies implemented by the firm. It was suggested that in the 
US, companies have a clearer fiduciary duty to maximise returns to shareholders (Friedman, 
1970), which could motivate US companies to avoid tax more aggressively than those from 
other countries. Reputation appears to be an issue with one interviewee highlighting the 
difference between US and UK attitudes:  
“… if you publish in the paper that Apple has significantly reduced its liability US people are 
not bothered by that, they applaud that. They don't think that that is a bad thing.” (I 10). 
It was suggested that there may be a more nuanced position in the UK with shareholders and 
the public more comfortable with a broader range of stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson 
& Preston, 1995; Evan & Freeman, 1988; Freeman, Wicks & Parmar, 2004). Others were 
motivated to reduce their tax but didn’t stress the need to balance that with other concerns: 
“Tax is like any other line in your P&L. It is a cost that you have a duty or an obligation to 
manage as effectively as possible.” (I1) 
“These things are not aggressive these are just things that are allowed for under the rules.” 
(I10) 
Companies consider the locations that they operate in with a view to exploiting differences 
between locations to reduce their tax bill. Tax advisers interviewed reported that companies are 
relocating to the UK and are attracted by the favourable tax system, the UK market itself and 
the access it (currently) offers to the European market remain the dominant drivers. For US 
businesses, the UK’s relatively low tax environment means that little tax planning may be 
required within UK subsidiaries as the tax paid on UK earnings would simply be offset against 
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US tax liabilities. The reduction of the US corporation tax rate to 21 per cent in the late 
December 2017 may impact the way that companies consider tax planning in the UK. One 
company reported that they do not claim R&D tax credits in the UK, as they are administratively 
complicated to claim. Whilst they would reduce UK tax liability they would simply result in a 
greater tax liability in the US. One expert confirmed the lack of incentive to plan taxes for 
companies deferring repatriation: 
“I think that that is why most of the planning probably comes from the top down because if you 
can't save the money up at the parent's jurisdiction there is really no point trying to drive down 
tax in the subsidiary jurisdiction. You would have to go to an awful lot of effort and overall, as 
an organisation pay the same amount of tax - to a different authority but there is no net saving” 
(I 7) 
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Size appears to be an important driver, particularly for companies with more international 
subsidiaries which appear to have more opportunities to avoid taxes. They are able to use 
transfer prices and royalty payments in particular to shift profits to lower or no tax subsidiaries. 
The use of external advisers which is thought to generate greater awareness of tax avoidance 
schemes was reported to be complex however (Jones et al., 2018). Some larger companies have 
greater in-house expertise and therefore relied less on external advisers and those with 
experience of smaller companies reported that less in-house expertise could increase the use of 
external consultants.  
Interviewees reported that there have been significant changes in the way that external advisers 
are used. They reported that currently, external advisers do not suggest or generate tax 
avoidance schemes in the way that they would have done a decade ago: 
“Over the last ten years, certainly years ago we would get approached a lot more about 
planning schemes – it was quite common and that doesn’t happen now.” (I 12) 
“when I say fewer advisors offering schemes – there are none” (I 12) 
Another area where significant change was reported is in the area of motivating staff, 
particularly in the use of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). Interviewees agreed that in the 
past the ETR had been the KPI on which tax departments’ performance was judged and that 
this had the potential to drive aggressive tax planning behaviour. Recent changes in attitudes 
towards taxation, however, had stimulated changes. There was some disagreement in the initial 
round of interviews about the extent of movement away from ETR targets. Some companies 
were reported to consider cash-flow or staying within a budget: “So if you are judged on 
whether you stay within your budget then you might not be very aggressive because you might 
not want to go and spend a lot of money on outside advisors. I can think of some large 
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companies that operate that way. I think that that is penny wise, pound-foolish kind of thing.” 
(I 10) 
“If someone has an ETR as a target, it is for the birds nowadays. There may be some 
organisations... but the vast majority of them, over 90 % will not have an ETR target. And if 
they do, they don't know what they are doing. They need to catch up.” (I 6) 
Most interviewees reported comparing the ETR with that of competitors or other high profile 
companies. One interviewee, however, made clear that they would never be concerned with 
what their competitors reported. Another reported having to reassure the CEO that they were 
adopting an aggressive enough stance: 
“Now from time to time our CEO will challenge us and say Starbucks is doing this, Amazon 
this, Apple is doing that, why aren't we doing that? And you know he sees that the tax rate is so 
low and we say but look that is not without risk and look whose names are in the papers every 
day about this stuff. We try to balance it.” (I 4) 
In the second round of interviews (three years later) there was broad agreement that targets had 
continued to move away from ETR based targets.  
Tax emerges as a key consideration for businesses operating in the UK but not as the dominant 
driver of company strategy. Tax departments saw themselves as facilitating the efficient 
implementation of corporate strategy rather than as initiators of strategy. Companies that 
engage in M&A clearly have wider opportunities for tax planning. One interviewee described 
the role of tax in the M&A that the company had made recently. The company would identify 
a target and then tax would become a key part of the planning around how the acquisition should 
be structured and financed: 
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“So the tax piece is always a critical piece as we are looking to do acquisitions but it is maybe 
second or third on the list. The first is obviously, ok what do we see in this business ... So once 
we identify a target and we think it makes good business sense then certainly as we get into the 
diligence then tax ramps right up to the top and we say how do we structure this from a tax 
perspective.” (I4) 
1.8.Frustrated tax avoiders 
In quadrant 2, companies are highly motivated to avoid tax but have few opportunities. Their 
motivations may stem from a number of factors such as: their culture and the people leading 
the company; they may be highly profitable (and hence have more to gain from reducing their 
ETR) or they could have cash flow problems meaning that a reduction in taxes paid will help 
them to continue as a going concern. The lack of opportunity may arise because they operate 
in more traditional bricks and mortar’ markets with little use of IP or flows of intermediate 
goods among subsidiaries located in different countries. If their motivation to avoid tax is strong 
enough they may find ways to reduce their ETR despite the few opportunities available. These 
may be tempted to adopt riskier tax planning strategies. They are referred to as the “frustrated 
tax payers”. Starbucks is a traditional ‘bricks and mortar’ company – it is clear where the 
customer is when they buy their coffees but they have been alleged to adopt tax avoidance 
strategies have to find alternative routes for tax avoidance (BBC, 2013; Reuters, 2012). For this 
reason it would fall within this quadrant although they may be positioned closer to the top left 
of the quadrant. Whilst they do not have the same opportunities to avoid tax as a digital 
company they have managed to find opportunities to avoid tax through the way that they have 
structured their business. For example, the coffee buying for the company is conducted out of 
Switzerland – whilst no beans are ever transported to Switzerland the subsidiary company that 
is based there is highly profitable – reportedly buying beans and selling on to subsidiary 
companies with a 20% mark up (Kleinbard, 2013). They have also created value through their 
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‘intellectual property’ – their logo and drinks recipes. This IP is held in a low tax country and 
then subsidiaries are charged for its use – therefore transferring profits to the IP owning 
subsidiary. 
The firms included in this quadrant are difficult to observe. Interviewees suggested that new, 
more restrictive regulations had been introduced which have reduced the scope for 
implementing tax avoidance schemes in the UK. They also reported improved efficiency on the 
part of the UK’s HMRC and the US’s IRS at shutting down schemes and at communicating 
what is an is not acceptable to companies. A change in attitude and development of a more 
positive relationship with HMRC was noted. One interviewee in the second set of interviews 
(interview 12), however, felt that over the previous two years (2016-2018) the relationship with 
HMRC had started to change and become more adversarial again. The interviewee posited that 
a lack of resources at HMRC, possibly driven by Brexit may have been the cause of this 
deterioration. 
One mechanism to avoid tax which may be open to some companies, inversion, where the 
structure of the company changes, moving the MNE’s headquarters away from the US, is 
clearly attractive to companies looking for mechanisms to reduce the tax liability. This option 
is becoming more difficult for companies to pursue; interviewees emphasised the regulatory 
hurdles and difficulty in achieving an inversion.  
One company revealed that they felt pressure to invert to reduce their tax liability, but felt that 
their ability to do so was hampered by their situation: “US market investors… they know our 
business, it is like bread and butter to them. They know exactly how we operate” (I 1).  The 
costs to the company itself and also to the shareholders were cited as reasons for deciding 
against an inversion. 
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A company’s financial situation could also affect their motive to avoid tax. The impact of the 
corporate tax bill on cash flow was raised by a number of interviewees. Companies that are 
struggling financially may be motivated to take a more aggressive stance in order to manage 
cash flow issues. If cash is needed back in the US for investment or for returning to shareholders 
as dividends, tax becomes a bigger issue, as the company will need find a tax efficient way to 
repatriate it. Others want to keep the cash in the UK for investment or other reasons. 
“There are a lot of factors that influence whether their stance is more aggressive or less 
aggressive and I have seen situations where companies had financial commitments and they 
had no choice but to be aggressive because they had cash flow needs and so they had no choice 
because they had to keep the banks happy.” (I 10) 
“It is about cash in the business and that is what all finance directors focus on... What the CFO 
really has to worry about is the strength of the balance sheet and the cash flow.” (I 8) 
“Tax is the biggest cheque of the year so the timing, the bank arrangements, the absolute 
amount, which can be dictated about where you have recognised your profits.” (I 8) 
There was a shared view that tax planning is justified as it relates to profit that is the reward for 
entrepreneurial effort. Companies are seen to have discretion over where they allocate at least 
a proportion of their income and profits. One interviewee described the issue as working out 
what proportion of the income could be categorised as “mobile” and then deciding where the 
company would like to allocate it. His view was that it may be more difficult to shift income in 
some companies than in others, but that there is always scope for some movement (I 9 and 13).  
Specific schemes reported by the interviewees relied heavily on the US “Check the box” 
regulations. Check the box is the US tax regulation, meaning that a US company can choose 
for the tax authorities to treat subsidiaries as divisions of the same company rather than as 
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separate companies called ‘check the box’ as it is implemented simply by ticking the box on 
IRS form 8832. This enables the creation of “hybrid entities” where an MNE subject to 
corporate income tax in one national jurisdiction qualifies for tax transparent treatment in 
another resulting in significant tax savings. This is accomplished when a company is organized 
as a partnership in one jurisdiction and as a corporation in another.  
One expert discussed the differences between companies and suggested that some are able to 
shift profits more easily than others but that there is always scope for companies to shift some 
profit: 
“My idea of thinking about this is that of my 100 per cent of profit in any given company in 
whatever their business model is, whatever their profit is, is going to be composed of profit that 
you can't move - services on the ground, production on the ground, etc. but there will be mobile 
income, profit which can be moved somewhere else through transfer pricing or other 
agreement: interest, royalty on IP, credit risk, obsolescence risk, insurance risk, employee work 
force risk. What can you move? What do you have that creates your profit? What can you carve 
out through contract and send your money somewhere else through an intercompany 
agreement. That is what TP is all about.” (I 9) 
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Debt with related interest expense and IP were cited as prominent parts of mechanisms to 
increase mobility of income. Booking operating losses in one entity can help with tax efficient 
repatriation but interviewees suggested that the opportunities available to companies were not 
always the same, with ‘bricks and mortar’ companies having to work harder to find ways to 
shift profits than digital companies.  
Transferring IP to low tax jurisdictions to facilitate royalty payments was seen as potentially 
problematic by some interviewees. When transferred from the US it would have to be valued, 
incurring a tax charge in the US. Early insight would be needed to make this effective. One 
interviewee stressed that companies would need long term planning to benefit from this: 
“If you start up a business in the US and on the third day you decide that you have got a lot of 
money to spend on your tax planning you possibly could be well advised to transfer your 
intellectual property to the Cayman Islands and pay tax on its value on transferring it out of 
the US” (I 8 ) 
Google transferred ownership of its IP to an overseas subsidiary shortly before it listed in 2004. 
Global subsidiaries now pay a royalty payment to this overseas subsidiary, effectively shifting 
profits to it and away from the operational subsidiaries. (I 8) 
Interviewees also discussed the complex corporate structures that have companies develop to 
reduce their domestic tax burden. Whilst complicated and expensive to implement interviewees 
felt that these could still add value: 
 ‘As soon as I look to bring money back the IRS is going to want to tax it but they will leave you 
alone generally speaking if it is a foreign company. You can always choose not to do that - you 
can choose to say - I don't want to leave it alone - I want to bring that money from that entity 
into the U.S… if you are smart about it and put these different structures in place - that is the 
benefit that you can get. So where all these companies are doing this - they are saying, this 
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entity I want to bring the income or expense back into the US but they are shells, they are 
holding companies so we are not really bringing the profits back of the real business into the 
US we are sort of creating an arbitrage and bringing back only what we want to bring back, 
for different planning reasons.’ (I4) 
‘The profitable entities are actually different entities in the UK group so that is not by accident 
because it is a way to get our money back to the U.S tax-free. Because since it has got no 
earnings, …we would say that this entity which is sending money back to the US has no earnings 
and therefore it is treated as a return of basis or a return of your initial capital which is tax 
free.’ (I4) 
 ‘And so there are various planning techniques that you can avail yourself of that will allow 
you to combine those businesses and in the long term extract those businesses from the US in a 
tax neutral way.’ (I 10) 
‘Financing is huge - the number one tax planning tool that people often play with on a regular 
basis. Second would be IP planning and then it is down into the sophisticated transfer pricing 
stuff and moving parts of your profits to different jurisdictions.’ (I 9) 
 ‘But you have got losses, I have got profits, I want to access your losses which you can 
definitely get value for where there is a deferred tax asset or actually saving corporation tax 
into the future. So you had complicated structures and they always struck me as contrived but 
I wasn't that close to them. We did them from time to time and I had to sign off on them.’ (I 6) 
1.9.Responsible tax payers 
Companies in quadrant 3 have been labelled as “responsible tax payers”. These are companies 
that may have opportunities to avoid tax but choose not to. This may be for cultural and ethical 
reasons or it may be for more pragmatic or strategic reasons. Company leaders may consciously 
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choose not to engage in strategic tax planning. These may be companies that are particularly 
concerned about their reputation because they are high profile and media may be more likely 
to report on their activities. Similarly, they may operate in a controversial industry, such as the 
defense sector, depend on government contracts, or work closely with the public sector. High 
tech companies such as those operating in the defence industry may have significant scope for 
profit shifting through the use of IP and royalties but reputational concerns may reduce their 
motivation to take advantage of some potential tax avoidance mechanisms. 
Other companies may see ‘responsible’ tax paying as part of their corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) strategy or may be motivated to improve their reputation by signing up to initiatives such 
as the Fair Tax Mark. The Fair Tax Mark is a certification scheme in the UK which recognises 
and certifies companies that: “pay the right amount of corporation tax at the right time and in 
the right place”. Once awarded the Mark, companies are able to display the Fair Tax logo on 
their website and publicity material. 50 (mostly smaller) companies have been accredited 
although larger UK companies such as Lush and SSE have also been accredited. 
Companies in this quadrant may have available opportunities to reduce their tax liability but 
their motivation to do so is not as strong. Companies and those working in them feel pressure 
to plan tax efficiently but interviewees feel the need to balance this “tax efficiency” with the 
need to protect the company’s reputation and to behave in a way that is consistent with their 
personal ethics. Companies were reported to be aware of the changes in government policy at 
the national and supra national level. Initiatives at the OECD such as the Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting (BEPS) project were thought to have had an impact on companies’ attitudes to, 
and willingness to invest in avoidance schemes. 
Interviewees felt that companies have a difficult balancing act. Whilst there are rules that have 
to be complied with, there is considerable scope for interpretation. Managers have discretion in 
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how they interpret the law; what is acceptable practice and what isn’t. This leads them to operate 
in what Muller and Kolk (2015) describe as “moral free space”. Compliance with the law is 
balanced with meeting the needs of shareholders: 
“So I think that that has become more of a balancing act. In the past it was more, you know, 
we are beholden to our shareholders and our shareholders alone, sorry if you don’t like it, bad 
luck. But I think that there is an internal debate now in most organisations as opposed to it 
being a very simple thing - we always do the thing that gives us the lowest tax outcome. I don’t 
think it is as clear as that anymore” (I 7) 
“We need to maximise our shareholder value, which means keeping costs and tax as low as 
possible, whereas on the other hand the Revenue would like us to pay loads of tax” (I 7) 
A firm with a clear “non-aggressive” stance on tax explained how they have to balance their 
stance with ensuring that they are delivering the best returns possible for shareholders 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983): 
“We are utilising the tax law as implemented and that is where the tax department focuses... 
we don't take that extra scam step...We reduce our taxes as effectively as we can but doing so 
in a moral way and in being a good corporate citizen.” (I 2) 
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All of the original interviewees felt that the incidence of tax planning was at relatively low 
levels and the follow up interviews confirmed that this trend was thought to have continued. 
The financial crisis of 2008 was described as a turning point, with attitudes to business changing 
as the public became more critical and hostile to “big business” whilst at the same time 
governments came under financial pressures to ensure that they were maximising their fiscal 
budgets. A number of reasons were suggested to be driving the lower incidence of corporation 
tax avoidance some reducing corporate motivation to avoid tax and others affecting the 
available opportunities 
Whilst interviewees believe that companies are now less aggressive in tax planning, it was 
unclear whether this reflected a fundamental change in approach. Whilst practices may be 
changing, some felt that this was due to a tightening of regulations and the greater difficulty in 
establishing legal tax planning practices, rather than from a fundamental change of attitudes. 
Some companies’ reputations were thought to be more vulnerable than others to charges of tax 
avoidance. Companies with direct relationships with the general public as consumers and those 
with the government or public sector as key clients were particularly averse to bad publicity. 
Consumer boycotts or bad publicity were seen as potentially doing harm to the business. Those 
operating in business-to-business segments or with no public profile could be more aggressive. 
Pragmatism appears to dominate tax planning strategy over any particular ethical stance. 
“There are definitely a couple of [companies in this industry] who in my experience will also 
be a lot better behaved now…but probably entirely because of the reputational damage that 
could arise, rather than them thinking it is the right thing to do”. (I 7)  
The same expert summed up the importance of both motivation and opportunity: 
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“I strongly suspect that there is a genuine trend towards companies doing less and less 
aggressive tax planning. Partly for reputational reasons and partly because it is just a lot 
harder than it used to be.” (I 7) 
One company had a specific reason for not avoiding tax: “We are dominated by government 
contracts …It is a smart business move to make sure that we are paying the right amount of 
taxes because with the government customer base that we have, we actually benefit from some 
of those taxes – they invest back in our business” (I 2). 
1.10. Straightforward tax payers 
Companies in quadrant 4 are likely to be domestic companies that have few opportunities to 
avoid tax and little motivation to seek out complex corporate structures to facilitate greater tax 
avoidance. Like the companies in quadrant 3 they are responsible payers but they may have 
fewer opportunities to avoid tax. They may be frustrated, recognizing that they are competing 
against international companies that after-tax planning have a lower ETR which affects their 
competitiveness but are likely to lobby for greater enforcement of tax regulations on these 
competitors rather than attempt to reduce their own ETR. The UK retailer John Lewis may fit 
in this category. As a domestic retailer they have few opportunities to reduce their tax liability 
but have spoken out about the pressure that they feel from companies such as Amazon. The 
previous Managing Director of John Lewis, Andy Street, argued that: “you have got less money 
to invest if you’re giving 27% of your profits to the Exchequer than, clearly, if you are 
domiciled in a tax haven and you’ve got much more. So they [digital retailers] will out-invest 
and ultimately out-trade us and that means there will not be the tax base in the UK. So I do 
think it’s an issue [taxing digital retailers] that needs to be examined.” (Daily Mail 2012) 
Interviewers felt that tax planning was more difficult for domestic companies or those lacking 
a sufficient overseas network or the knowledge needed to create one. The company’s attitude 
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to risk would also play a role in whether it chose to develop and engage in tax avoidance 
practices. Interviewees also suggested that a change in attitude at some companies was driven 
by an understanding that they have a responsibility to a wider set of stakeholders other than 
simply their shareholders 
The company’s overall attitude to risk was also thought to drive its approach to tax planning 
with the adoption of aggressive tax avoidance considered as an inherently risky strategy. Whilst 
attitudes to risk or tax avoidance could change over time this was likely to happen slowly in 
most instances as people trying to push for change more quickly would be resisted. This risk 
aversion was felt to permeate across all aspects of the business and was set by individuals at 
the top of the organisation.  Risk aversion in tax was felt to be part of the “ethos, rather than 
prescriptive policy” (I 5). The top management team of this company has a system for setting 
“visions and values” and these are then systematically devolved down through the group to 
individual team members. 
Almost all interviewees felt that their companies took a conservative attitude towards tax 
avoidance. The interviewees seemed to feel that their companies took only “sensible”, limited 
tax avoidance measures that any company would. Discussion about the tax planning measures 
that they implement, however, revealed a wider dispersion. Tax advisers similarly felt that the 
advice they gave was not overly aggressive and the companies that they were advising adopted 
relatively conservative stances. Complications arise with complicated or “flamboyant” 
structures that require strong governance to overcome: “You have got to be very clear that you 
are in control of that structure – the more it is skewed from the normal business life the tighter 
your controls need to be on it.” (I 5) 
Interviewees suggested a number of drawbacks of tax planning that had to be balanced with the 
potential tax savings. There was real concern about the potential for damage to a firm’s 
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reputation (see next section below). Increased administrative and regulatory burdens were cited 
as added costs to the firm of implementing complicated tax schemes and structures.  Uncertainty 
also increased as the potential for regulatory change could mean that a scheme that is currently 
approved becomes illegal in the future which could result in significant costs. Current legal 
advice that a scheme was legitimate may not stand up in court further into the future. 
DISCUSSION 
Implications for theory 
First, a core theoretical contribution of this study is to develop a typology of corporate tax 
planning: companies vary in the different emphasis they place on tax avoidance, that is, there 
is significant heterogeneity in the motivation to avoid tax. Some companies have more 
opportunity to avoid tax than others. The very motivated ones will find mechanisms to reduce 
their tax liability whatever the opportunity but for some companies developing a tax planning 
strategy is more straightforward than for others. As tax planning has become an increasingly 
important phenomenon, and our findings, also help to explain why and how MNEs adopt a 
particular tax planning strategy. We undertook detailed qualitative work for this study, which 
makes a vital contribution towards opening the “black box” of the tax planning of the MNE, 
towards going “Inside the Multinationals” as advocated by Rugman (1981). This is particularly 
important in a subject like corporation tax where issues of confidentiality and transparency 
generate difficulties and deficiencies in more traditional forms of data analysis. The qualitative 
research allows us to develop a new theoretical framework which considers the interactions 
between motivations and opportunities for tax planning. The MNE’s motivations, or the extent 
to which they choose to avoid tax appears to reflect the long-term assessment of its implications 
for the future of the company. This highlights the opportunity and ability of MNEs to choose 
their tax strategy and to determine the aggressiveness with which they pursue tax planning.  The 
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theoretical framework also allows us to identify four typologies of corporate tax payers –the 
aggressive tax avoiders, the frustrated tax payers, the responsible tax payers and the 
straightforward tax payers – as summarized in Figure 1.  
Second, analysing what drives the heterogeneity observed between companies (Dyreng, 2008) 
is key to generating new understanding about corporate strategy but is also a vital component, 
contributing to understanding for policy makers in this field. We uncover the heterogeneity of 
approaches adopted by MNEs. Our detailed analysis reveals a wide range of potential 
opportunities, mechanisms and measures that can be used to reduce tax legally. The firm makes 
a decision whether or not to use these methods because they have to consider the balance 
between tax savings versus the risks of damage to corporate reputation in case of aggressive 
tax planning is adopted. Not only do our results find important variations in the opportunities 
for tax planning, they provide some significant insights towards considering which tax planning 
strategy is more likely to be susceptible to risk moving the strategy towards the boundary of 
what is acceptable (and hence potentially sustainable) and what is unacceptable (hence viewed 
with great hostility by local stakeholders). Indeed, the interviewees argue that as public interest 
has grown in this tax avoidance phenomenon, following the global financial crisis of 2008, 
MNEs are taking a longer-term approach, more conscious than previously of the potential 
damage to their corporate reputation. The overall analysis suggests that firms’ tax planning 
aims to optimise rather than minimise their ETRs. 
Third, some firms are highly motivated to reduce their taxes and plan strategically; others have 
different motivation driven by a range of factors which may include a concern for their 
reputation, an ethical or CSR stance or the sector in which they operate. Whilst international 
firms in particular have scope for tax planning through profit shifting between tax jurisdictions, 
domestic companies in particular have fewer opportunities. Further work is needed to analyse 
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the impact that this difference has on domestic competition. There are also potential 
implications for researchers working on subsidiary management. The role and relationships 
between head office and subsidiary (Birkinshaw and Hood 1998, Tippman et al 2018) may play 
a role in the way that tax planning is structured. It is important that this area is considered in 
future research. 
Implications for practice  
Whilst the focus of this paper is at the firm level it is worth noting that interviewees concluded 
that the people within the company, the overall management and culture are also important 
factors that drive the aggressiveness of the tax stance. CFOs, CEOs and the board were all felt 
to have a role in “setting the overall tone” of the company and its attitude to risk (Dyreng 
Hanlon & Maydew 2010). Responding to a question about what drives their tax position one 
interviewee said simply: “The tone at the top” (I4). Another replied: “Culture. The most 
important thing about [Company name] I would say is our culture and embedded within that is 
the business ethics associated with that - that is our discriminator.” (I2). Future research is 
needed to focus on the role of individuals within the firm to understand the differences that 
appear to emerge between them and to identify the drivers of these differences. 
Whilst the focus of this study is not on tax policy per se, there are some clear implications for 
policy makers and for MNE tax managers. Our findings show the flexibility that MNEs 
currently experience within the international tax regime given that the differentials in tax rates 
across countries provide MNEs with vast opportunities for arbitrage. MNEs demonstrate 
behaviours that enable them to plan their tax liabilities. The background and experiences of key 
executives involved in setting and managing tax policy within the MNE will have an impact on 
its overall strategy. The characteristics of the firm will denote the areas where it has greater 
scope for tax planning. The overall aggressiveness of behaviour that emerges will be a 
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consequence of these two factors and it is clear that many MNEs choose to optimise their ETRs 
rather than minimise. 
There are clear implications for managers of MNEs – both at the headquarters and at the 
subsidiary level. Management needs to be clear that when they are setting their tax planning 
strategy they are making a choice with implications not only for the corporation tax paid but 
also potentially, risks to the business including those of public perception and potential damage 
to their corporate reputation. Executives should actively manage their tax planning strategy in 
the light of these potential trade-offs. 
Changes to the legislative framework may be needed to address these areas. Tax executives 
argue that they respond to the legal framework and may feel pressure from within the company 
or from shareholders to reduce their tax liability if they are out of line with their peers. Tax 
planning and payments need to become less of a choice and more of an obligation for MNEs.  
Our study finds that MNEs do not adopt a homogenous approach to tax planning and 
government policies need to respond to these differences.  
LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
This is a highly innovative piece of research in this field and it is hoped that this study will 
provide impetus and direction for future pieces of research as discussed below. The study 
includes interviews with the variety of the senior executives of companies and tax advisory 
firms and their different wide-ranging experience ensures that a wide spectrum of views is 
included. Finding knowledgeable participants of sufficient seniority who have insights and are 
willing to discuss their company’s approach to tax planning is inherently difficult. This study 
circumvents this problem through the use of networks to identify potential interviewees. The 
interviewees were prepared to give a comprehensive picture of their company’s approach to tax 
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planning. It also meant that a broader range of companies with different approaches to tax 
planning was identified. 
Our initial interviews were conducted in 2016. Since then there have been significant changes 
in business environments in the US and the UK, such as the reduction of corporate income tax 
from 35% to 21% in December 2017 in the US and the Brexit referendum with the UK leaving 
the EU and its impacts on the location attractiveness and future business direction for UK 
operations of US MNEs. Whilst our follow up interviews in 2019 were able to encompass some 
of these changes more work is needed to understand the driving forces behind the motivation 
of organisations and the interaction of the individuals within them taking into consideration of 
changes in external environments. Future research is also suggested to explore the tax planning 
behaviours of MNEs headquartered in Europe, Japan and emerging economies and compare 
and contrast the findings with our study on US MNEs with UK subsidiaries.  
Qualitative research could contribute to probe this phenomenon further. Research is also needed 
to provide a greater understanding of the different opportunities presented to companies, 
considering the industry and other factors that can drive these differences. It may be that the 
motivation of the MNE plays a stronger role in the position adopted than the opportunities 
presented. A strongly motivated company may be able to find ways of structuring their 
businesses enabling them to avoid tax even when it would appear to be more difficult. Research 
could focus on comparing the different approaches taken to strategic tax planning by companies 
with similar opportunities to establish the role of motivation. 
By developing theory further we hope to enable researchers to consider a wider range of 
countries, and companies in a consistent manner. The recent changes to the US tax regime will 
be of interest to researchers but understanding the way in which developing countries develop 
and expand their tax regime is an area where scholars may be able to make a significant impact. 
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Whilst we focus on only two countries in this paper we intend to broaden and deepen future 
research in order to test our typology in different circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
We explore the interactions between motivations and opportunities in MNE tax planning. We 
use a qualitative method and conduct 15 semi-structured interviews with senior executives of 
U.S and UK nationals of US MNEs with UK subsidiary operations and tax advisory firms. The 
findings are complex and nuanced. MNEs clearly adopt strategies to optimise their corporation 
tax expense. This is an important new finding made by this study: firms optimise rather than 
minimise their ETRs. This can make measuring tax avoidance and evaluating the scale of the 
problem difficult. It is clear from the interviews that MNEs, or those working within them, 
make choices about how much tax should be paid and where they should pay it. 
Whilst the scope of tax avoidance practices seems to have reduced following the global 
financial crisis in 2008, there is uncertainty about whether this reflects a fundamental shift in 
attitudes within companies or simply more limited scope as a result of tighter budgets and 
regulations. The company’s reputation plays a key role, limiting tax minimisation and instead 
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Table 1: Summary of Key Papers on Motivation of Tax Planning 
 
Reference Research Design / Sample Key Variables Findings / Conclusions 
Impact of Reputation 
Austin and 
Winter 2017 
Uses ‘Harris Interactive’s 
EquiTrend survey’ to measure 
importance of brand. Include 
control firms with no brands. 
2006 – 2011. 1,770 firms with 
4,704 ‘brand years’ in total. 
 
IV: Measure of brand 
importance. 
DVs: GAAP ETR and Cash ETR 
(1 and 3 year measures) 
Reputation affects corporate tax planning which 
they argue provides partial explanation for cross 
sectional variation in tax avoidance 
Chen, Huan, Li 
and Stanfield 
2012 
Sample from Schedule 13D and 
13D/A filings from the EDGAR 
database of the SEC. They 
identify 435 activist hedge 
funds and 2,981 activist events 
in the period 1994–2008. 
 
 
IV: Hedge fund activism 
DVs: 4 different measures of 
tax avoidance: ETR, cash ETR 
and two based on book tax 
differences. 
Businesses targeted by hedge fund activists exhibit 
lower tax avoidance levels prior to hedge fund 
intervention, but experience increases in tax 




Survey responses from 600 
corporate tax executives to 
DV: ‘harm to firm reputation’ 
from survey 
Find that reputational concerns are important with 69% of 




investigate firms’ incentives 
and disincentives for tax 
planning.  
IV: Cash ETR (3 year); 
measure tax sheltering 
in order of importance among all factors explaining why firms do 
not adopt a potential tax planning strategy. Also find that financial 




Search Factiva database for 
firm names associated with tax 
sheltering (1990 – 2004). 
Sample of 97 firms 
Event study methodology to 
test market reaction to news 
of tax avoidance (over 3 day 
period). DV: market valuation 
of after tax income stream 
IV: Cash ETR 3 year period 
prior to event; Measure of 
governance of firm. 
Find that, on average, a company's stock price 
declines when there is news about its involvement 
in tax shelters. This reaction is less negative for 
firms that are viewed to be generally less tax 
aggressive, as proxied by the firm's cash effective 
tax rate.  
    
Impact of Management and Leadership 
Chyz and 
Gaertner 2018 
Use sample of firms forcing 
CEOs to leave adding to 
previous work and compile 
database of 4,087 occasions 
using text search terms. Add 
financial data from Compustat. 
IVs: Cash and GAAP measures 
of ETR 
DV: Forced CEO turnover 
 
Find evidence of a relationship between paying low taxes and 
forced CEO turnover. Forced CEO turnover is also more likely 




Paper that models the optimal incentive 
compensation contract for a tax manager 
and how the form of that contract 
changes in response to alternative 
enforcement policies imposed by the 
taxing authority.  
 Conclude that the optimal contract may adjust to offset, perhaps 
only partially, the effect of any sanctions against illegal evasion. 
They conclude that penalties imposed on a tax manager are more 





Analyse link between tax 
avoidance and management 
incentives. Theoretical model 
of the impact of incentives on 
choices. Use data from 
Compustat and Execucomp. 
1993-2001. 
DV: book - tax gap less 
accruals 
IV: incentives, index of 
corporate governance quality, 
ratio of value of stock options 
/ total compensation top 5 
executives 
Controls -size (logs of assets, 
sales, market value) 
Incentive compensation appears to dive tax 
avoidance. Particularly true for firms with weak 





Combines samples from prior 
studies of tax shelter 
behaviour, to create sample of 
118 firms who have engaged in 
tax shelter activity (1995 – 
2005). 
IV: identification in previous 
studies as engaged in tax 
shelter 
DV: CEO / CFO / auditor 
turnover; measures customer 
activity, being in Fortune 500. 
Do not find evidence of increased chief executive 
officer (CEO), chief financial officer (CFO), or 
auditor turnover in the three years following tax 
shelter revelation and find no impact on customer 
activity (change in sales, sales growth, or 
advertising expense). And find now impact on the 
public media reputation of a firm, as measured by 
 66 
the Fortune magazine list for “Most Admired 
Companies,”  




Uses exogenous earnings 
shocks at the parent firm level 
and investigates how these 
impact on profit shifting – how 
shocks move across the low tax 
and high tax MNE subs. 
Large panel of European 
multinational affiliates over the 
period 1995–2005. 18,000 
observations on 4,000 firms.  
DV: log of PBT. 
IV: construct and use measure 
of profit that would have 
expected before profit 
shifting. 
Control: for variations in 
country characteristics. 
Parents’ positive earnings shocks are associated 
with a significantly positive increase in pre tax 
profits at low tax affiliates, relative to the effect on 
the pre tax profits of high tax affiliates. 2% of 
parents additional earnings are shifted to low tax 





Financial statement data to 
estimate ETRs for 10,642 
corporations from 85 countries 
from 1988 to 2007. 
DV: ETR 
IVS: Country, foreign subs 
(dummy), industry, size 
(assets, revenue, equity) 
MNEs and domestic companies face similar ETRs. 
ETRs declined by 20% over the period. German, 
Japanese, Australian and Canadian decreases were 




and Lanis 2015 
A hand-collected sample of 286 
publicly listed U.S. 
multinational firms over the 
DV: An index to measure 
transfer pricing 
aggressiveness made up of 8 
Results indicate that multinationality, tax haven 
utilization, and intangible assets are significantly 
 67 
2006–2012 period (2,002 firm-
year observations). 
 
components related to intra 
company interactions. 
IVs: multinationality, tax 
haven utilisation and 
intangible assets. 





Table 2: Summary of Key Papers on Opportunities/ Mechanisms/ Methods Used in Tax Planning 
 
Reference Research Design / Sample Measures Key Variables Key Findings / Results 
Location 
Azemar (2010) Regresses US capital invested 
abroad on foreign average 
corporate tax rates. Uses 1992, 
1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000 US 
Treasury CFC files compiled by the 
IRS. Includes the 7,500 largest 
foreign corporations controlled by 
US MNE with total assets in excess 
of 500 million USD.  
The average tax rate for each country 
is calculated controlling for the impact 
of other determinants of US activity 
abroad - host country GDP, GDP per 
capita, and trade openness, real 
exchange rate, physical infrastructure, 
and a Law and Order index. 
Investment is strongly influenced by 
average tax rates, particularly for 
low-tax rates. Firms report higher 
profit, higher Subpart F income, and 
are less likely to repatriate dividends 
when in low-tax jurisdictions. Low 
degrees of law enforcement are also 







Large international firm level data 
set incorporating a range of 
European countries and 
companies. Consider the 
interaction between home and host 
country corporate and withholding 
tax systems on the location decision 
of MNEs. Sample analysed over 
multi country framework. 
DV: location. IV: tax (corporate 
statutory rate) Controls: for market 
size (GDP as a ratio of the GDPs of all 
potential host countries); contiguity 
(common border); difference in 
labour costs (log of ratio of labour 
costs in home and host country), 
economic freedom, EU membership. 
Even with deferral parent country 
taxes exert an effect on MNEs. 
Location decisions for highly 
profitable subsidiaries are less 
responsive to tax inducements than 
for less profitable subsidiaries. 
Location decisions of foreign 
subsidiaries with low fixed assets are 
more sensitive to parent and host 
country taxes. 
Desai, Foley and 
Hines (2006) 
Consider the types of firms that use 
tax havens and the purposes that 
they are used for. Sample of US 
MNE between 1982 and 1999 using 
BEA survey data. 
DVs: haven dummy, share of affiliates 
in havens, share affiliate sales in 
havens, share haven affiliates in Big 7 
havens, share affiliate sales in Big 7 
havens, ratio foreign taxes to sales, 
affiliate sales growth in non tax 
havens, affiliate net PPE growth in non 
tax havens.  
IVs: log of non haven sales, log of 
parent sales, av non haven tax rate, 
ind. Av non tax haven tax rate, ind 
Larger, more international, more 
R&D intensive firms and those with 
more intra company transactions are 
more likely to have tax haven 
companies. Find that use of large tax 
haven countries are to reallocate 
taxable income. Smaller tax havens 
are used more to defer repatriation 
 70 
share of sales to related parties 
abroad, parent ind R&D ratio, own 
affiliate in haven, parent owns 
affiliates only in dot tax havens, 
country tax rate, leverage, leverage 
interacted with country tax rate, begin 
of period sales in havens, beg period 
net PPE in havens, GDP growth rate. 
Devereux and 
Griffith (2003) 
Develops theory and new measure 
of average ETR to consider the 
choices made by MNE in particular 
location. Estimates EATR for series 
of countries 1979 – 1999. 
Forward looking average ETR 
measured using weighted average of 
an effective marginal tax rate and an 
adjusted statutory tax rate with 
weights dependent on profitability. 
Concludes that more profitable 
investments are more responsive 
than less profitable investments. 
De Mooij and 
Ederveen (2006) 
Based on met analysis to 
understand variation in elasticity 
FDI to corporate tax rates. 
Transform findings from each 
study into tax rate elasticities – how 
FDI changes in response to tax rate 
change. 
DV: FDI (range of measures). IV: Tax 
rate (range of measures). Control for 
study characteristics – type of capital 
data used; type of tax data used; 
whether home country adopts credit 
or exemption system; distance; time. 
Heterogeneity of approaches in 
research means can’t make single 
estimate. Median value of elasticities 
of 2.9. Type of capital data used is 
important – amount of capital 
invested is more responsive to taxes 
than the location itself. 
 71 
Hines and Rice 
1994 
Considers ability of MNEs to shift 
real activity and profits between 
tax jurisdictions. Identify 41 
countries as tax havens, the split 
between ‘dot’ havens and larger. 
 
DV – pre tax non financial income. 
IV – tax rate 
Control for capital and labour inputs. 
Control for productivity (log GDP per 
capita) 
Tax haven subsidiaries account for 
more than 20% of US FDI and a third 
of profits. Revenue maximizing tax 
rate for tax haven is 5-8%.  Find tax 
rate has significant negative impact 
on income. 1 % higher tax rate results 
in 3% lower reported profits. 
Transfer 
pricing 
Rugman (1985) Theoretical paper applying 
internalization theory to the 
Canadian petroleum industry and 
criticizes a paper on TP. 
  
Eden, Valdez and 
Li (2005). 
Event study methodology using the 
stock market prices of American 
Depository Receipts of all Japanese 
MNEs with US subsidiaries over the 
1990s to assess the impact of the US 
TP penalty on the stock market 
valuation of Japanese MNEs with US 
subsidiaries in the 1990s. 
 Find that the penalty caused a drop in 
their cumulative market value of 
$56.1 billion, representing 12.6% of 
their 1997 market value 
 72 
Clausing (2003) Monthly data on US international 
trade prices over 1997, 1998, and 
1999 to investigate the impact of 
tax on intrafirm trade prices. 
425,000 observations of monthly 
prices. 33% of these observations 
are for exports. 38% observations 
are intrafirm trade. 54 countries. 
DV: prices of products – intrafirm and 
non intrafirm 
IVs: ETR and statutory tax rates 
Control: exchange rates, industry, 
whether price originally in $. 
Substantial evidence of tax-
motivated TP in US intrafirm trade 
prices. Strong and statistically 
significant relationship between 
countries’ tax rates and the prices of 
intrafirm transactions. As country tax 
rates are lower US intrafirm export 
prices are lower, and US intrafirm 
import prices are higher. 
 73 
Zucman (2014) 
Uses national balance sheet data to 
estimate amount held in tax havens. 
Overall more financial securities 
are recorded as liabilities than 
assets. Estimates overall tax loss to 
governments. Computes ETR at US 
national level. 
BOP statistics to show where income 
is held (not generated). 
BEA data – estimate taxes paid by US 
firms on the profits recorded in tax 
havens. 
US national ETR – divides all 
corporate taxes paid by US firms by US 
profits. 
From 1998 – 2013 US ETR fell from 
30% to 20% - 2/3 this change can be 
attributed to tax avoidance. 
Concludes that 2008-2013 the 
amount of money in tax havens 
increased by 25%. Hidden wealth 
accounts for $7.6trillion. 
Intangible assets, royalties and overheads 
Grubert (2003) How tax planning and use of IP and 
debt affect ETR. To which 
subsidiary profits should be 
allocated when made across 
countries. 
Calculates overall ETR on US 
manufacturing abroad and 
decomposes. Then uses data from 
company reports to Treasury to 
calculate ETR at subsidiary level to see 
which pay above / below average in 
different locations. 
Taxation of royalties, use of tax 
havens, and allocation of interest 
expenses impact ETR. Host countries 
favour mobile investment and those 
offering employment to locals. 
Exporters are treated favourably but 
importers are penalized. Subsidiaries 
of R&D intensive companies pay 
higher ETR  - host country 
governments extract rents. 
Gravelle (2009) Article reporting on use of tax 
havens and their definition. 
Literature review summarising 
previously published research and 
Corporate profit shifting may cost the 
US government up to $60 billion in 
 74 
Estimates amount of tax revenue 
lost to US government from use of 
havens. 
concluding on potential policy 
options. 
revenue and remedies are likely to 




2,077 firms (1995–2004). Only 
those with profits. Extent to which 
some firms are able to avoid taxes 
over periods as long as 10 years, 
and how predictive one-year tax 
rates are for long-run tax avoidance 
Develop and describe new measure of 
LT (10yr) corporate tax avoidance 
(Cash ETR). 
Find considerable cross-sectional 
variation in tax avoidance. Annual 
cash ETR are not good predictors of 
LT cash ETR. Low annual cash ETR 
are more persistent than are high 
annual cash ETR. Firms successful at 
keeping their cash ETR low over long 
periods are well spread across 
industries but with some clustering. 
Shackelford, 
Slemrod & Sallee, 
2011  
Theoretical paper presenting a 
formal model of the idea that some 
investment decisions may be more 
attractive because they provide 
managers with discretion over the 






Uses US Treasury tax return data 
from US CFCs. Compares earnings 
from royalties etc in 1996 and 2002 
after introduction of check the box. 
Also uses BEA data on affiliate 
operations and royalty payments. 
Some regression analysis but largely 
discussion of trends in data on 
royalties, CFC income and IP. 
Hybrid firms have enabled greater 
migration of IP assets out of the US. 
Firms have incentive to leave returns 
to R&D abroad. Parent R&D was a 
more important determinant of 
royalty payments to US parents than 
affiliate earnings and profits in 1996, 
but played a larger role in earnings 
and profits than royalties by 2002. 
Dischinger and 
Riedel (2011) 
Use panel data from AMADEUS on 
European MNEs and control for 
heterogeneity between affiliates. 
Focus on industrial EU parent and 
subsidiaries-25 1995–2005.  
At least 3 subsidiaries to ensure 
sufficient size so that can observe 
strategic allocation intangibles. 
Exclude MNE with losses. 
DV: intangible assets 
IVs: statutory tax rates (home and 
host), unweighted average corporate 
tax rate relative to other subsidiaries 
Control: GDP per capita, population, 
R&D expenditures as % GDP, 
corruption index, unemployment rate 
The lower a subsidiary's corporate 
tax rate relative to other affiliates of 
the group the higher is its level of 
intangible asset investment. Effect is 
statistically and economically 
significant, even after controlling for 
size etc. Mean value of intangible 
assets for both parent and 
subsidiaries is increasing over time. 
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Internal debt and capital structure 
Gordon & Lee 
2001  
Time series data; US corporate 
income tax returns (1954-1995) 
and balance sheet data on all 
corporations, to estimate the 
effects of changes in corporate tax 
rates on the debt policies of firms of 
different sizes. 
DV: debt ratio (total, LT and ST debt) 
IVs: statutory and ETR 
Controls: real assets per return, net 
assets, land/assets, cash/assets, 
accounts receivable / assets, 
intangible assets / assets. 
Taxes have had a strong and 
statistically significant effect on debt 
levels. If the corporate tax rate is cut 
by 10%, holding personal tax rates 
fixed, this will reduce the fraction of 





How financial decisions affected by 
tax. Considers debt to asset ratio for 
domestic and foreign owned plants 
and the extent to which difference 
is systematically related to 
corporate taxation. Data from 
32,000 European MNE. 
DV: debt ratio 
IV: statutory tax rate, loss 
carryforwards to correct statutory 
rate.  
Controls: Foreign MNE ownership, 
firm age, plants per region and 
industry, employees, regional worker 
compensation, cost intermediate 
goods, total assets. 
Find that foreign-owned firms have 
higher debt ratio than domestically 
owned counterparts in the host 
country. Difference increases with 
the host country’s statutory 
corporate tax rate.  
 




Financial statement data to 
estimate ETRs for 10,642 
corporations from 85 countries 
DV: ETR 
IVS: Country, foreign subs (dummy), 
industry, size (assets, revenue, equity) 
MNEs and domestic companies face 
similar ETRs. ETRs declined by 20% 
over the period. German, Japanese, 
 77 
from 1988 to 2007. Australian and Canadian decreases 
were large. American, British, and 
French declines were more modest. 
Dharmapala and 
Riedel (2013) 
Uses exogenous earnings shocks at 
the parent firm level and 
investigates how these impact on 
profit shifting – how shocks move 
across the low tax and high tax MNE 
subs. 
Large panel of European 
multinational affiliates over the 
period 1995–2005. 18,000 
observations on 4,000 firms.  
DV: log of PBT. 
IV: construct and use measure of 
profit that would have expected 
before profit shifting. 
Control: for variations in country 
characteristics. 
Parents’ positive earnings shocks are 
associated with a significantly 
positive increase in pre tax profits at 
low tax affiliates, relative to the effect 
on the pre tax profits of high tax 
affiliates. 2% of parents additional 
earnings are shifted to low tax 
subsidiaries due to the strategic use 
of debt across affiliates.  
Hanlon and 
Heitzman (2010) 
Literature review covering: (1) 
Financial accounting for income tax 
expense, (2) corporate tax 
avoidance, (3) corporate decision-






Table 3: Background information of senior tax executives for interviews and organizations  
 
Interview Individual (s) Organisation 
First round of interviews in 2016 and second round of follow-up interviews in 
2019 
Interview 1 UK national. Qualified with smaller audit 
company before moving to Big 4 firm as tax 




Interview 2 Two US nationals. One tax specialist in UK on 
secondment for a year, been with company 
for 30 years. One Chief Operating Officer, 
been with company for 8 years. 
Industrials company 
 
Interview 3 UK national. Qualified with Big 4 firm. Been 
with company for 10 plus years. 
Telecommunications 
company 
Interview 4 US national. Qualified with Big 4 firm. Works 
out of US. Been with company 5 plus years 
Consumer staples 
company 
Interview 5 UK national. Qualified with Big 4 firm. 
Worked for another company for 10 years 






Qualified 35 years ago. Varied career in tax 
throughout specific industry including time 




Qualified with Big 4 firm and worked there 18 
years. Recently (2 plus years ago) moved into 
industry 
Financial Industry  
Interview 8 UK national. Tax Partner with Big 4 firm. 
Worked there 25 plus years. 
Big 4 audit firm 
Interview 9 
and 13 
US national. Worked as Tax Partner in Big 4 
firm. Now works at boutique tax advisory 
firm. Worked in Tax 30 plus years 






US national. Tax Partner at Big 4 firm. Has 
worked for 2 big 4 firms over 30 plus year 
career. 
Big 4 audit firm 
Interview 11 UK national. 30 year career in industry 
including work as transfer pricing specialist 
covering significant legal cases. Now an 
independent transfer pricing consultant 
Independent transfer 
pricing consultant 
. 
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